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I. RELEVANCE OF STUDYING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN BELGIUM
Studying Christian Democratic parties in Belgium is mainly interesting for
three particular reasons. First, in the post-War period, most of the time the Christian
Democrats have been the strongest political formation in Belgium. It reached the
peak of its post-War electoral strength in 1950, by capturing 48% of the national vote
(and an absolute majority in parliament), while its lowest score occured in 1981
(26%). The CVP, the Christelijke Volkspartij (Christian People's Party) has always
been the strongest party in Flanders (its vote varying between 60.4% in 1950 to
31.4% in 1987). But in Wallonia the PSC, the Parti Social Chrétien, is only the
second or the third party (with a maximum of 34.2% in 1958 and a minimum of 20.1%
in 1971.
Second, the CVP-PSC is the most important governmental party of the
post-War period. It became the pivotal coalition party after the 1950s, the hard core
of each coalition from 1958 on. It has always been in government, (apart from the
1945-1947 and the 1954-1958 period), usually choosing its partner between the
Socialist and the Liberal parties. Thus, it has strongly dominated cabinet policies and
provided most ministers. In, addition, nearly all post-War prime-ministers have were
Christian Democrats, usually belonging TO the CVP. Through this permanent
participation, it has also strongly "occupied the state" and semi-public institutions.
Finally, the CVP-PSC is the political representative of the Catholic pillar and
its wide variety of organisations, which in itself has undergone major changes in the
post-War period (deconfessionalisation, secularisation, professionalisation, etc.) It is
thus an interesting case as far as the relations between party, pillar and societal
changes are concerned.
II. CREATION AND RECENT HISTORY (SHORT VIEW)
1. From the 19th century until World War II
At its creation in 1830, the Belgian Kingdom was a hybrid state. In the North
there was a Catholic, conservative, largely agricultural Dutch-speaking Flanders, and
in the South the more free-thinking, progressive, largely industrialised
French-speaking Wallonia. The creation of the Belgian state was the result of the
collaboration of Catholic and Liberal bourgeoisie in opposition to the Dutch King.
Thus the first 16 years of the existence of the Belgian state were characterised by
"unionist" government, i.e. coalitions of Catholic and Liberal notables. The first
political tendency which organised itself as a national political party were the Liberals
in 1846, and the Catholics started organising national congresses from 1863 on, but
only in 1879 the Catholics began to organise themselves seriously as a political part,
bringing the local catholic electoral associations under one roof. At first, the party was
mainly a bourgeois, conservative organisation, interested mainly in defending the
interest of the Church and the Catholic schools. The working class wing, representing
the Catholic workers organisations which were set up (after the enlargement of the
franchise in 1893) in order to offset the attraction of the Socialist pillar organisations,
grew in strength within the party, together with the peasant's league. Thus by 1914,
the Catholic Party consisted of three distinct wings: the conservative, Fédération des
Cercles, the working-class Ligue Démocratigue Belge, and the peasents Boerenbond
("Farmers League").
In the Interbellum, these three "standen" ("estates") or "familles" (to which
was added an estate representing the so-called middle classes (i.e. shopkeepers,
artisans and small entrepreneurs) became more important than the actual party
organisation. People could not join the Union Catholique directly, but only by one of
its factions. In fact, the Union Catholique was only a federation of four distinct
estates, each enjoying a large autonomy. There was no common political
programme, only collaboration at the moment of the composition of the electoral lists
for the parliamentary elections. In 1936, a reorganisation took place, creating the
Bloc Catholic Belge, with a Flemish and a Walloon wing (with individual
membership), which reduces somewhat the impact of the factions.
2. From World War II until 1968
The new Christian Democratic party, the CVP-PSC, was. created in 1945,
and was a party quite different from its predecessors. It terminated its formal links
with the Church, organised itself on the basis of individual membership instead of
indirect membership through the standen (although it did not abolish the standen); it
became an interclass party, aiming at the realisation of social and economic justice
for all citizens. It had two wings, a Flemish (CVP) and a Walloon (PSC), but kept an
unitary structure. The formulae soon became very successful and the party obtained
an absolute majority in 1950 in both chambers and in 1958 in the Senate.
3. The post-1968 period
The party split up along linguistic lines due to the growing linguistic conflict
between Flemish and Francophones in the 1960s. The divorce was triggered off by
the question of the division of the Catholic University of Louvain, whereby the
French-speaking sections were forced to move out of the Flemish-speaking city of
Leuven into new campus on French-speaking territory. This demand was strongly
supported by Flemish public opinion, but resented by the French-speakers as
discriminatory and insulting. The government of the PSC-prime minister Vanden
Boeynants could not reach an agreement on this issue and resigned, lost
considerably in the subsequent general elections, and consequently both wings
opted to act as autonomous parties, leaving some coordination structures (national
president, praesidium, national headquarters and secretariat) in existence, but these
organs slowly became inoperative or were split later on. Since the split up, both
parties have drifted apart considerably, in terms of organisation, functioning, ideology
and electoral evolution. Therefore we cannot consider the PSC and the CVP as one
party "disguised" for electoral reasons as two parties, but two competitive actors in a
partially overlapping political arena (electorally, they only compete in the electoral
circonscription of Brussels Halle Vilvoorde, (Louvain and Nivelles), in the cabinet and
in parliament they operate as fully independent and often competitive actors). On the
other hand, since their creation as two independent parties, they have always been in
government, thus asymetrical coalitions (one party in the majority, the other in the
opposition) have not arisen yet (which is also the case for the other traditional parties
-Socialist and Liberals wich also split up along linguistic lines in the 1970s).
III. PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CVP AND THE PSC.
What are the characteristics of both parties in terms of internal structure,
leadership, factionalism, ideology, and governmental participation? These aspects
could be approached in several ways: one could offer a snapshot of the party at a
given moment in its history, one could adopt a historical approach, stressing changes
over time; one could stress the differences between the CVP and the PSC, or
between these two parties and the other (traditional) parties in Belgium, or between
the CVP-PSC and the features of other Christian Democratic parties in comparable
political systems (such as the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Luxembourg, the German
Federal Republic, etc.).
We prefer to adopt a more flexible approach which basically refers to the
features of the CVP and the PSC in the most recent situation (1980s), but in case of
major changes over time differences between the present situation and the situation
in previous decades will be shortly touched upon. Occasionally, some specific
differences in comparison with other Belgian parties and other Christian Democratic
parties in Europe will be highlighted. At the end of my expose, we will touch upon
some major problems which the Belgian Christian Democrats are facing.
A. The internal party structure of the CVP and the PSC
The CVP and the PSC have basically three organisational levels: the national
level, the constituency level ("federal", "arrondissemental"), i.e. the level of the
circomscription for the parliamentary elections; and the local level (the comunes) (in
both parties there also exist a provincial organisational structure, but this level is not
operational in all provinces. In some cases there is even a specific organisation at
the sub-constituency level (the "cantons"), and the local sections can also- create
subdivision ("sections").
1. Party organisation at the national level
At the CVP national level, we find basically the following organs:
a) the National Party Congress
The National Party Congress is mainly composed of representatives of the
local parties, and officeholders within the constituency and national party structures.
In principle, the congress is the highest decision-making body of the party: it
establishes the party statutes, the party program and the policies to pursue. In
practice, it decides on the adoption of the party's electoral manifesto, on
governmental participation (by approving the governmental agreement reached
between coalition parties), and the party's basic ideological positions. It elects the
national party bureau and the national party president. It also holds conferences on
specific themes which are on the political agenda (like the environment). It has to
meet at least once a year. It usually draws about one thousand participants.
b) the National Party Bureau
The National Party Bureau is composed of the party president and
vice-presidents, 10 non-MPs, the leaders of the parliamentary parties in the
Chamber, the Senate, the European Parliament and the Flemish Council (regional
parliament), the prime minister and vice-prime ministers of the national cabinet and
the Flemish Executive, eventually the chairman of the House and the Senate, the
president of the party youth organisation, and of the party women's organisation. The
national secretary, the head of the party research centre and of the political formation
institute and the party spokesman have an advisory vote. It counts about 40
members (1986). It is responsible for the daily leadership of the party organisation: it
coordinates the initiatives and positions of the parliamentary groups, and defines the
positions of the party on current issues in between congresses. It meets at least once
a week.
In between the congress and the party bureau, there is the National Party
Board ("Partijbestuur") (N=37, 1986): it is mainly responsible for party discipline,
party rules and the general party organisation and management, party finance and
electoral campaigns, party nominations in the public sector, etc. It meets less
frequently (once a month). It can call for a National Party Council, which includes the
members of the national party board, of the parliamentary parties, the presidents of
the constituency and local parties, and some representatives of the women and
youth organisation. Usually a party council is held when there is not enough time to
call for a congress and the party leadership still wants to sound a party basis wider
than the relatively narrow party bureau and board (such as for the election of an
interim party president and a modification of the coalition agreement).
The FISC is organised more or less in the same way as the CPV: at the top
we find the Président National (assisted by the Sécretariat National), the daily
leadership is exercised by the Comité Directeur . The Congrès National however is
open to all party members, and deals basically with ideological matters. In between
the Comité Directeur and the congress, we find the Conseil Général, a body similar
to the CVP National Party Council, and wich gathers only when the Comité Directeur
wants to sound a larger audience, without calling for an all-member congress, such
as for the approval of governmental agreements, or recently the composition of the
candidate list and programme for the 1989 European elections. The main difference
with the CVP national party organisational structure is the selection mechanism for
the national party president.
c) the National Party President
Until the fall of the Vanden Boeynants government over the division of the
Catholic University of Louvain, the unitary party elected a national president, and also
two vice-presidents ("wing"-presidents), who were appointed separately by the
Flemish and the Francophone wings.
The statutes of the CVP stipulate that the National Congress elects the party
president, from a candidate list composed by the Party Council. The PSC introduced
in 1969 an entirely different selection system, i.e. a direct, secret vote by all party
members. The revolutionary idea of a direct member election of the party president
was promoted since 1965 by the party youth organization of the PSC and other
renovating forces, in order to stop the cooptation of the post-War veterans by their
fellows. It was meant to facilitate the renovation of the party by increasing the
chances of the following generation for seizing the presidency and other party offices.
In fact, the new 1969 statutes did not only render the selection of the national
president more democratic: on all party levels, leadership positions were to be
accorded by a secret vote of the members.
The CVP-statutes concerning the selection of the party president suggest a
fully democratic electoral process while practice strongly deviates from the statutary
model. First, within the CVP (and the unitary party), there was very rarely more than
one candidate (three times out of 33). No incumbent president was ever challenged
in the unitary party and in the CVP. The single candidate is usually elected by an
overwhelming majority.
The selection of the PSC presidents displays quite a different picture. First, in
most cases there was more than one final candidate. At contested elections, the
winner's majority ranged between 46% and 77% (average = 66%), which does
indicate that a real competition between the candidates was going on. In addition,
twice an incumbent president was challenged. The official participation figures range
between 54% and 29% of the members, and it seems the participation rate is in
decline.
While the PSC-procedure is obviously more democratic, it allows discontent
of the rank-and-file members with a president in office to manifest itself more easily.
In addition, the secrecy of the voting procedure renders opponents to the leadership
less identifiable, and therefore less vulnerable to leadership reprisals. This is another
incentive to manifest disagreement in the vote. The fact that the PSC presidency
changed hands seven times since 1969 seems to indicate that the democratization of
the procedure jeopardized the stability of the office, as well as the authority of the
president. Even when up until now no incumbent president has been ousted by
member votes, a close reelection, such as the mere 60% of Deprez in 1988, clearly
does not strengthen the president's internal and external authority.
The party leader is responsible for the daily political leadership of the party.
He chairs the meetings of the party bureau and acts as the main party spokesman
towards the media. He is also responsible for the management of the party as an
organisation, and sometimes he de facto  controls the secretariat (which is not always
the case in other Christian Democratic parties, like in the Italian Democrazia
Cristiana).
But in a system of "partitocrazia", as the Belgian political system is often
defined, party leaders exercise additional influence over the national political
processes. First, party presidents play an important role in the selection of ministers.
Constitutionally ministers are nominated by the King. By now, the role of the King in
the selection of ministers is reduced to his appointing the cabinet "formateur", who
will have to negociate between parties in order to elaborate a governmental program.
Hence the selection of ministers is delegated to the formateur. But also here we
notice an evolution in the post-War period. Until the beginning of the sixties, the
formateur himself looked for capable people in each coalition party (taking factional
equilibria within these parties into account). By now, the selection procedure is totally
controlled by the coalition parties, and in particular by their presidents and the party
bureaus. At the end of the coalition negociations, the number of ministerial posts and
the departments each party acquires is decided, and party presidents fill these
vacancies according to their wishes.
Party leaders do not only decide on the question of who will govern, but also
on the how of governing. Governmental agreements in Belgium tend to be very
extensive and very detailed, and serve as a "supreme guide" or "the bible" for the
governmental actions to be taken by a cabinet once started. Party leaders (and some
party experts) play a predominant role in the elaboration of these agreements.
But the impact of party presidents is not only limited to the creation phase of
a cabinet. Each week, the ministers of CVP and the PSC dine with their party
president (and sometimes the leaders of the parliamentary groups) in order to
discuss the cabinet agenda and define the positions ministers should adopt.
Finally, party presidents are usually potential challengers to the position of
the ministers or even of the prime minister. Most CVP and PSC party presidents
became minister or even prime minister (some became chairman of a legislative
body). Hence, the president's office in the CVP and the PSC serves as a springboard
to the highest public offices.
d) Coordination between CVP and PSC
After the official split of the unitary party into two autonomous parties in 1969,
some foreign authors still continue to consider the CVP and PSC as one party. In
fact, just after the break-up, several interparty decision-making structures were
maintained or created, but slowly they became inoperative. For instance, in 1969 a
national party president was elected (while each party elected also their own
president), but already in 1972, this function was not filled up anymore. There used to
be a Permanent Political Liaison Committee (composed of the members of the party
bureau of each party), and a Praesidium (composed of the presidents of the parties,
the national secretary, leaders of the parliamentary parties, and some ministers), but
also these contacts slowly faded away, and by now the presidents of the CVP and
the PSC do not see each other more than they meet with presidents of other coalition
parties. Also the institutionalised collaboration between parliamentary groups (as far
as the representation in committees is concerned) has vanished. The national
secretariat has also split into two. The only real remainder of the old unitary party is
the party research centre, the Centre d'Etudes Politiques, Economiques et Sociales
(CEPESS), but in practice the dutch-speaking collaborators conduct research for the
CVP and the Francophone researchers for the PSC (but MPs of both parties still
have the occasion to meet each other at the joint subject meetings of the CEPESS
research groups). Thus, at the end of the 1980s, the CVP and PSC have to be
considered as fully autonomous parties (just like the other traditional parties
-Socialists and Liberals- which split up in the 1970s along linguistic lines). Gradually
they dropped all institutional forms of collaboration and joint-decision-making.
In addition, at the governmental level, competition between CVP and PSC is
sometimes as fierce as the competition with the other coalition parties. For instance,
in 1987 Gérard Deprez, the president of the PSC, provoked the resignation of the
Martens VII government, because he wanted a change in coalition, dropping the
Liberals for the Socialists, while the CVP was strongly opposed to any coalition with
the Socialists. And with regard to regionalist and linguistic issues, CVP and PSC
ministers are as strong advocates of the (self-) interests (or group egoism) of the
Flemish or Walloons as the ministers of the more radical Parti Socialiste or the
Flemish Nationalists. Thus at the cabinet level, clashes between CVP and PSC
ministers over regional and linguistic issues are relatively frequent.
2. Party organisation at the constituency and the local level
At the local and constituency level, the party is organised according to the
same framework as the national party: congress, (board), bureau and president. The
local party organisation plays a certain role in the selection of candidates for the local
elections. The selection of candidates for the general parliamentary elections is
decided by the constituency party (infra).
 The CVP and the PSC have by now reasonably active local sections in all,
communes (there are 308 communes in Flanders, 262 in Wallonia, and 19 in the
Brussels region). In a majority of the Flemish communes (56.5%), the major belongs
to the CVP (N=174), and in 62% of the Flemish communes (N=192) (1983-1988) the
CVP is participating in the local government. The CVP scores in general better at the
local elections than at the national elections, especially in those communes in which
it participates in the local majority. Being only the second or third Francophone party,
the PSC is of course less represented in the executive organs at the local level.
3. Party management, membership and political personnel
The CVP has about 140.000 members (1987), a membership which
constitutes nearly 12% of its electorate. The PSC has only 43.000 members, or about
8% of its electorate. The degree of organisation (i.e. the ratio members/voters) of the
CVP-PSC lies around the national average, but far behind the best "encadred"
electorate, i.e. the electorate of the Parti Socialiste (which 18% of its voters being
party member in 1985).
In Belgium, the CVP is probably the best professionally organised party, with
a highly reputed research centre (CEPESS), and Institute for Political Formation
(IPOVO) for the party cadres, an organisation for elected office holders, a specific
women's and party youth organisation, and a wide range of publications (including a
weekly magazine). The CVP was also the first party to professionally work on its
public. relations (organization of electoral campaigns by commercial marketing
bureaus, specialized TV-training of the party's spokesmen, etc.).
The CVP and the PSC have also instituted a quota system in order to
guarantee a fair representation of women and the young amongst it intraparty
political personnel. The CVP statutes stipulate that at least 1/5 of the position holders
in party offices should be women, with the effect that in the CVP women hold more
leadership positions than in the other traditional parties. At least one third of the
members of CVP leadership organs has to be younger than 35. With regard to the
representation of women in the PSC, the statutes stipulate that if in an electoral
circomscription the PSC can count on three effectively elected candidates, one
candidate has to be a woman. This rule is effective for all types of elections. On the
other hand, no special provisions exist as far as the representation of the young in
the PSC are concerned.
B. Factionalism within the CVP and the PSC
Contrary to the more personalised factions (as in the Italian Democrazia
Cristiana) or the denominational factions (as in the Dutch Christian Democratic
Appeal), the factions in the CVP-PSC are primarily based on the socio-economic
interest groups linked with the party (like the österreichische Volkspartei).
Factionalism is institutionalized mostly within the Flemish Christian
Democrats. As already mentioned, the CVP is a Flemish Catholic catch-all party
which appeals to workers, middle classes and farmers. These three socio-economic
categories are highly organised. The Algemeen Christelijk Werkersverbond  (General
Christian Workersassociation, ACW) represents the workers, the National Christelijk
Middenstandsverbond (National Christian Middle Classes Association, NCMV) the
middle classes, and the Boerenbond (Farmers' League, BB) the farmers. All consider
the CVP to be the sole political representative of their interests. All three have active
sections at the constituency level and are represented as "standen" (estates) in the
local and the constituency parties and the national party. Each tries to maximise its
power within the party, through controlling the selection of political personnel at all
levels, and through permanent lobbying of this personnel, including their
representatives in Parliament and in the Cabinet.
1. The parliamentary representation of the factions
As religion became politically less salient in the sixties, the socio-economic
cleavage gained in importance and increasingly divided the three interest groups. On
the eve of elections all groups try to secure as many safe places on the electoral lists
as possible. By now, leaders of these interest groups on the constituency level
almost entirely control the candidate selection process, which secures them an
important tool for the enforcement of conformist political behavior on the part of their
representatives, both inside and outside Parliament. This control is highly
institutionalised. Delegates of the three interest groups in the constituency party
committee come to an agreement regarding safe places which they can reserve for
their own candidates. In most constituencies an enduring agreement has been
reached.
So nearly all CVP-parliamentarians obtained their seat because one of the
factions offered them a safe place on an electoral list. In 1985, 46.9% of the CVP
Representatives belonged to the ACW group, 12.3% to the BB, 26.5% to the NCMV
and 8.2% were backed both by the BB and the NCMV. Only a few were not backed
by any of the groups. These "sans familles" CVP-parliamentarians are usually
national party leaders or Cabinet members, with a strong electoral appeal. They
cannot be neglected in the bargaining process between the groups.
The distribution of partiamentary seats has undergone some evolution in the
1945-1985 period. The ACW parliamentary representation remained stable (about
one third) until 1958, then it progressed until it captured nearly half of the seats in
1974 and held this level of representation from that moment on. In the 1946-1958
period the BB and the NCMV (added together) saw their representation rise from one
third to one half. In the next ten years their share decreased to 44% and since then it
remained around that level. The share of the "sans familles" decreased continuously
in the 1946-1978 period, from 33.9% to 7.41%. Then it stabilised around this
minimum. Hence, the period after 1974 is characterised by a consolidation of the
distribution of parliamentary seats among the three factions and the "sans familles".
The factions do not only exert a predominant influence on the selection of
parliamentary candidates. Once elected, the parliamentary representatives of the
factions keep in close touch with their stand. The ACW-parliamentarians are invited
to assist the ACW National Bureau each time political matters are on the agenda. In
addition a contact committee exists in which ACW-parliamentarians and the ACW
leaders meet monthly. Within the constituency, ACW-parliamentarians also keep in
close contact with the constituency leaders of the ACW.
The BB-parliamentarians are member of the CCLT (Centraal Comité voor
Land- en Tuinbouwbelangen - Central Committee for Agricultural and Horticultural
Interests), in which the BB leadership discusses with their parliamentary
representatives the political actions to be taken to defend BB interests. It meets three
times a year. But BB-parliamentarians meet also once a month in order to prepare
their parliamentary work. CCLT-committees function also on the provincial level.
Generally, the national BB-leadership scrutinizes closely whether political actions of
their political representatives follow their guidelines.
The NCMV-parliamentarians are organised in the NCMV Political Committee,
whose role is to coordinate political activities and to define a strategy for the
elaboration and the follow-up of legislative initiatives regarding the middle classes.
Members of the Committee are also invited to attend the NCMV General Assembly
and are member of the research committees of this Assembly. NCMV Political
Committees also operate on the constituency level.
In the PSC, socio-economic interest groups are less well organised than in
the CVP. In addition, many changes occurred in the institutionalised representation of
the three social categories within the party framework. French-speaking Catholic
workers are organised in the Mouvement Ouvrier Chrétien (MOC). The MOC factions
seeking political representation by the PSC are (since 1972) organised in the
Démocratie Chrétienne (DC). At the constituency level these factions have their
representatives in the constituency "Comité Directeur". They recognize parliamentary
candidates as their political representatives in the PSC and promote their candidates'
selection by the Comité Directeur and also sponsor their election.
The MOC sought political representation solely into the PSC until 1972. At
that time it decided that also parliamentarians of other parties (especially the
Rassemblement Wallon and the Front Démocratique des Francophones) could act
as their representatives. The political representatives within the PSC were grouped
into the DC, in which a Political Committee was constituted, including all DC-
parliamentarians. In 1977 the MOC created the Fondation Politique  (with MOC
representatives within the PSC (DC), the RW and FDF) in order to coordinate
concertation with regard to the political strategy and actions of the MOC.
The representation of the Catholic middle classes in the PSC has undergone
many organisational changes. The right wing of the PSC was first organised in the
Movement des Indépendants et les Cadres (MIC). In 1972, the PSC recognized the
Centre Politique des Indépendants et Cadres Chrétiens  (CEPIC) as the sole
representative of the middle classes, the cadres and the liberal professions within the
PSC. In 1981 the PSC broke with the CEPIC because intraparty left-right conflicts
were about to threaten the very existence of the party. Finally, the
CEPIC-parliamentarians abandoned the CEPIC, and constituted with some "sans
familles" the Rassemblement du Centre (RDC). Yet, the disappearance of CEPIC
has not decreased the impact of middle class and right-wing factions on the PSC in a
significant way.
The French-speaking Catholic farmers' organisation, the Alliance Agricole
Belge, is not officially recognised by the party as an intraparty "famille", but it does
have individual representatives defending agricultural interests. Finally, there also
exists an unstructured group of "sans familles" PSC-politicians unrelated to the DC or
CEPIC.
Stable institutionalised agreements between the representatives of the socio-
economic interest groups within PSC constituency parties are less common than in
the CVP. In many constitutencies there is no tradition of bargaining or seat-sharing.
Consequently conflicts between the DC and CEPIC on the eve of elections have
been more frequent, and usually more bitter than in the CVP. Since the PSC is also
smaller than the CVP, it can count only on one safe seat in most constituencies, so
often there is no package of seats to share between the tendencies. This usually
results in the selection of a neutral, "sans familles" candidate, acceptable to all
factions.
In 1981, the DC accounted for 32.4% of the PSC parliamentary seats, the
"sans familles" 47.1% and the CEPIC 20.6%. This distribution, as in the CVP, has
undergone some important changes in the 1946-1981 period. Initially, the share of
the DC was rather weak, remaining under 20% until 1958. It rose to 40% in 1977 and
then declined again to 32%. The CEPIC representation remained rather stable in the
period of its existence (slightly above 20%). The "sans familles" scored around 40%
in the 1974-1978 period, but they grew to 47% in 1981.
2. The ideological diversity of the factions’ representatives
Quite often the CVP-leadership states that although the party is indeed
suppotted by separate "families", that this does not lead to a strong ideological
heterogeneity. In this view the factions are only means of organisational
encadrement of the different social categories belonging to the Catholic world.
Data collected from interviews with all Christian-Democratic members of the
Chamber does not support this vision. On some issues, CVP MPs differ considerably
in opinion. Most controversial issues within the CVP are situated on the left-right
dimension, like repatriation of migrant workers, reduction of income differences,
economic state intervention, and "mittbestimmung". And most of these issues are
controversial because MPs of the three factions differ in opinion on these issues.
3. The parliamentary government support of the three CVP-factions
The same research revealed that the ACW-parlementarians prefer a
centre-left coalition (with the Socialists) to a centre-right coalition (with the Liberals).
The parliamentarians of the BB and the NCMV prefered just the opposite.
4. The ministerial party
Factionalism within the CVP and PSC does not only manifest itself on the
level of the parliamentary party. The factions and the "familles" are also very well
represented on the ministerial level.
Of the 168 CVP Cabinet members (ministers and secretaries of state) in the
1958-1985 period, 41.1% belonged to the ACW, 14.0% to the BB, 16.4% to the
NCMV and 28.6% were not affiliated to any faction. Hence, on the ministerial level
we find more "sans familles" than in the parliamentary party (=11.8% for the same
period). The ACW is represented in the Cabinet in more or less the same way as in
the parliamentary party (42.4%), and the BB and the NCMV are clearly
underrepresented in the Cabinet (21.5% and 24.3%). Contrary to representation of
the factions in the parliamentary party, there is no clear evolution on the ministerial
level.
Of the 114 PSC Cabinet members 29.0% were affiliated to the CEPIC, 29.8%
to the MOC, and 41.2% were "sans familles" (the high percentage of the latter is due
to the fact that the CEPIC has only manifested itself after 1971, leading to the
classification of right wing Cabinet members before 1971 as "sans famille"). If we
consider only the 1971-1985 period, the CEPIC Cabinet members represent 39.3%
of the PSC cabinet delegation, the MOC 37.5%, and the "sans familles" only 23.2%.
Compared to the parliamentary representation of the "familles" in the relevant period
(1974-1985), the MOC is more or less equally represented (36.8%) and the CEPIC is
strongly overrepresented (21.7%). Contrary to the CVP, the "sans familles" are
strongly underrepresented at the cabinet level (41.6%).
Another point of interest is the kind of departments ministers of different
factions administer. Are they spread at random over the different type of
departments, or do factional ministers have reserved domains? Looking at it
department-wise, some departments seem to be the exclusive hunting ground of one
faction. For instance, the Prevoyance Sociale department has always (in the period
1958-1985) been directec by a ACW or MOC minister (unless it was given to a
minister of another party). The same goes for the department of Labor and
Employment, and also Family and Public Health (with one exception). Other reserved
domains for the ministerial representatives of the Catholic workers factions are Public
Works, Transport & PTT, and Civil Service.
The Agriculture department has most of the time been directed by a BB
minister, and sometimes by a representative of the CEPIC or a SF. Hence, the
Boerenbond virtually "owns" the department. They never had to give it out of hand to
another faction or another party (contrary to the workers factions, who sometimes
have to leave their favorite departments to the Socialists). The Classes Moyennes
Department has been most of the time in "safe hands" as well (=NCMV, CEPIC or
SF) but sometimes it had to be left to the Liberals.
Interior is chared by the right factions (NCMV, CEPIC) and the "sans
familles", and the same goes for the Foreign office, the Justice Department and
Institutional Reforms portfolio. Finance has nearly always been directed by a "sans
famillie". Departments which are not monopolised by one of the factions include the
prime ministerial office, Budget, Defence, Economy, Education and Culture and
Regional Policies.
5. Factionalism and the selection of party presidents
As far as factional affiliation of the party presidents is concerned, a vast
majority of presidents did not belong to any faction. This is remarkable, since the
number of "sans faimilles" within the party leadership declined steadily, especially in
the CVP. Although the number of "sans familles" politicians within the CVP has
declined considerably, it has clearly not jeopardized their chances to become
president. On the contrary, the increased role of the factions has made it unlikely to
find a faction-affiliated candidate who would be fully acceptable to the other factions.
Hence the factions reach more easily a compromise over a neutral "estateless"
candidate.
C. Ideological evolution and position on the three basic cleavages
The most recent ideological manifest of the CVP (1986) states the party's
four basic concepts are: personalism, responsibility, solidarity, and intendancy. From
these four principles many policy orientations and political values are deduced. Of
course, many of these do not belong to the monopoly of Christian Democratic parties
(democracy, human rights, full employment, etc.). The more specific policy positions
which differ from (some) other parties are prohibition of abortion, euthanasia, the
preservation of the Flemish cultural character, the support for private initiatives in the
sector of education, public health, socio-cultural work, etc. The state should refrain
from taking initiatives in these sectors (unless the private sector is obviously
defective). On the other hand, the state should finance these private -usually
pillarized- organisations active in these sectors (principle of subsidiarity). All types of
voluntarist social activities are supported. The party stresses the importance of the
small and medium enterprises, the market, but also strongly supports the
neocorporatist arrangements between the representative organisations of the
workers, the employers, middle classes and the farmers (which is quite
understandable given the strength of the Christian Democratic economic pressure
groups). Workers should participate in the decision-making within their enterprises for
all vital matters (investments, employment, incomes, technology). It supports a
maximal version of federalism, where the regions would get all competences, with
the exception of those which are vital for the functioning of the Belgian state. The
party pays particular attention to the family, favouring a tax system which is favorable
for the families.
On the socio-economic cleavage, the CVP is in practice to the left of the
Liberals and to the right of the Socialists. The PSC stresses its centre position on the
socioeconomic left-right dimension and preaches solidarity between different social
classes. With regard to denominational issues, the CVP and the PSC proclaim to be
a deconfessionalised party, but they act as the strongest defenders of Catholic
schools and other pillar organisations (the debate with other parties turns around the
question "how much schould be given", and not "whether" they schould be
subsidised). In addition, on many moral issues, the CVP and the PSC are at the
extreme of the political spectrum (on that dimension). Finally, the CVP is more
sensitive to linguistic issues than the Flemish Liberals and Socialist, but of course
less federalist than the Flemish Nationalists (Volksunie). On the other hand, the PSC
is reputed to be the strongest unitarist party, nostalgic for the "Belgique à papa", the
heyday of the unitary Francophone bourgeois state. It favors a "fédéralisme d'union",
or a rather minimal interpretation of federalism. Recently, under the presidence of
Deprez, the federalists have gained ground in the PSC, and for the moment, the old
grade of unitarists seems to have lost predominance.
D. The impact of the CVP and the PSC on government policy
P. De Grauwe, a neo-liberal economist concerned with the enormous
increase in the role of the Belgian state in the economy, found that the political
composition of the governmental majority has little if any impact on the rates of
increase in governmental spending in the 1960-1983 period. He distinguishes
between centre-left (Christian Democrats and Socialists) and centre-right
governments (Christian Democrats and Liberals). In the period under consideration,
growth of governmental spending vis-à-vis the GNP is higher under centre-right
governments (3.4%) than under centre-left coalitions (2.5%).
In a second analyses, the author looked at "functional" expenses (for the
1960-1982 period), and came to some remarkable findings, especially as far as the
ideology-sensitive categories are concerned. For instance, defense spending
decreases more under a centre-right government than under a centre-left. Also
categories with a "social" character such as social security, public health and public
housing increase less fast under a centre-left government than under a centre-right
one.
The author also analysed the "political economy" of tax burdens in Belgium.
In the 1960-1983 period, the overall tax burden increased by 2.6% per year. Under
centre-right governments, the average annual increase amounted to 13.3%, and
under centre-left it was only 2.2%. In addition, deficit spending seems to be more a
habit of centre-right governments than of centre-left.
De Grauwe concludes that "the evolution of the total governmental expenses
and its composition nearly never reflects the ideological preferences of the
consecutive governments" and that "in some partial domaines of governmental
finances plays a perverse effect". The author explains these phenomena by using the
hypothesis of the median voter. Governments that want to stay on have an interest in
directing their actions towards the profile of the voter who is situated in the middle of
the political spectrum. In order to cover the midfield, governments will sometimes
even tend to "overshoot". For instance, centre-right governments will tend to move
even to the left of the centre, in order to compete with the left opposition. They will be
accused by the left opposition (and the left of the centre-right coalition) of favouring
the rich and neglecting the poor. In order to satisfy the left within the majority and the
left of the centre voters, a centre right government will adopt a number of policies
advocated by the left opposition. And vice versa for a centre-left government. In
coalition government, the party most likely to "overshoot", is of course the party
closest to the centre, because it is particularly the right or left flank that is threatened
by the opposition. The analysis of the evolution of the structure of government
expenditures in Belgium suggests that the CVP-PSO has been "overshooting"
systematically.
Another explanation for the lack of policy variation in terms of governmental
expenditures structures can be derived from the analysis of Klingemann and
Hoffenberg of the impact of the German parties on governmental expenditures. They
found that the changes in the governmental expenditures structure is much more
determined by the policy preferences expressed in the FDP programme (the smallest
coalition partner) than the programmes of the CDU or the SPD. The authors explain
this strong FDP policy impact by refering to the pivotal power of the FDP in the
coalition. The hypothesis stating that in coalition government the pivotal party
determines more the governmental policy than the other coalition parties, could
explain the lack of variation between centre-right and centre-left governments in
Belgium. First, the pivotal party in the Belgian party system, i.e. the CVP-PSC is the
party at the centre of the political universe (at least on the socio-economic left-right
dimension), and therefore centrist policies will tend to be dominant. In addition, the
pivotal-centrist party is also the largest party in terms of parliamentary strength. Both
factors, strength and pivotal position, explain the very centrist, stable and immobile
character of Belgian governmental policies (in terms of expenditures).
Another factor which strengthens the impact of the CVP-PSC on government
policy is party patronage. The Belgian civil service is highly politicised, in the sense
that all university trained personnel is promoted through party-political patronage.
The quota of nominees of each coalition party is negociated during the cabinet
formation talks. Hence, administrative elites are composed of nothing but party
recruits. Given the fact that the CVP and the PSC have been permanently in
government since 1958 and have been usually also the largest coalition party, they
always managed to nominate more civil servants than their electoral strength would
allow for (between 50 and 80% of the nominations). This patronage favours a
Christian Democratic policy "outlook" of the administrative elites, and thus adds to the
stability of the governmental policy in spite of changing coalitions (this permament
and profound "occupation of the state" allows the CVP and the PSC also to operate a
well oiled clientelist machinery, which is essential for e maintenance and recruitment
of party voters (infra)).
IV. PROBLEMS OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN BELGIUM
1. Ideological ambiguity and lack of coherence
Up until the end of the 1950s, the conflict dimension between the Catholics
and the non-Catholic part of the population was very salient, and most clashes
between the two groups occured over the issue of the financing of Catholic schools.
This dimension was a strong factor for the ideological and organisational cohesion of
the CVP-PSC. However, in 1958 a pact (the "Schoolpact") was signed between the
leaders of the Christian Democrat, the Socialist and the Liberal parties, which solved
in a satisfactory way the problem of the financing of the schoolsystem. Thus the
strongest "cement" of the Christian-Democrats (the interests of the Catholic pillar),
faded away. Thus space was created for the other two important conflict dimensions
to become more important. In the sixties, the linguistic problem became very obert.
The federalist parties in Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels broke through electorally,
becoming a serious threat to the traditional parties. This eventually led to the split of
the unitary CVP-PSC in 1968 (which also made the Liberals and the Socialists split in
the 1970s), and this problem remained on the political agenda since then. But with
the economic crisis of the 1970s, also the economic left-right opposition became
more salient. The Socialists pleaded for a progressive front between Socialists and
the workers wings of the Christian Democrats, opening their ranks to Catholics of the
left. The Liberals, who had opened their ranks to Catholic conservatives already in
the 1960s, became an interesting alternative for the right wing of the party. For a
short while, in the middle of the 1970s, the CVP and the PSC managed to cope with
this centrifugal tendencies, primarily due to professional party management of the
party by president Martens, the replacement of the post-War political generations by
a relatively young generation, and the charismatic leadership of Prime Minister
Tindemans. But in 1981, the CVP and the PSC lost a quarter of their voters, and they
remained more or less on that level since then. The CVP-PSC have thus a serious
problem in defining the specificity of their ideological programme as being more than
a pragmatic compromise between the positions of the parties at its right and its left.
In addition, in the 1980s the Ecologists became an important threat to the party's
electoral strength as well. At the European Elections of 1989, the Greens scored over
12% in Flanders and over 16% in Wallonia, most votes coming from former Christian
Democratic voters (voting intentions for the parliamentary elections reveals a
electoral strength of about 10% for the Greens).
2. The growing impact of factions in the party organisation
The growing impact of factions in the party organisation decreases the
flexibility of the party as an organisation, and the necessity to find compromises
between the factions outside the formal party structures. This reduces the official
party organs to something like "phantom" decision-making bodies, who officially
endorse decisions taken outside the formal party structures. This jeopardizes the
democratic operation of the party, and discourages participation of the party militants.
It sometimes leads to discontent of the rank-and-file expressed at party congresses
or more frequently to revolts amongst the backbenchers in parliament. These revolts
make it difficult for ministers and party leaders to fully respect the agreements made
with coalition parties at the moment of the creation of a government. This leads to
nervousness and distrust by the other parties and in the end to cabinet instability.
"What does the CVP want?" is a question that occupies strategists of the coalition
parties permanently. They harbour a constant fear that the CVP will "pull a trick on
them", making the government fall over on a issue that favours the Christian
Democrats, and then call for a general election. Belgian governments usually fall
because one (or more) faction (s) of the Christian Democrats withdrew its support for
the cabinet (and usually calls for a change in coalition).
3. Leadership competition and factionalism
Being a factionalised party, strong leadership within the CVP and the PSC is
difficult to arrive at. The emergence of a strong leader would jeopardize the power of
the factions. Every faction tries to boost the popularity and power of its trustees in
government and in the party leadership, and play down the qualities of the leaders of
the other factions.
The prime minister can not fully play the role of a strong leader. First, he is
not always the most important leader of his party, but often the result of a
compromise (between the factions, or because he is more acceptable to the coalition
partners). He usually does not have enough power to have the policy of his coalition
cabinet fully accepted by all the factions of his party as the best policy alternative.
Finally, usually the party president is or becomes a virtual challenger to his position
as the real leader of the party, and even a potential successor to his position as
prime minister. So, in practice, the CVP and the PSC, which in the post-War period
nearly always provided for the prime minister, have consumed many prime ministers.
Many prime ministers have been disavowed by their own party. Some were put in a
"quarantaine" for a while (G. Eyskens, VDB, Martens) and were allowed to make a
come-back after a couple of years. Gaston Eyskens was for instance prime minister
in 1949-1950, 1958-1961 and 1968-1973, and in between these periods he was "sent
into the desert".
4. The decreasing electoral strength of CVP-PSC
The analysis of the socio-demographic and political characteristics of the
Christian Democratic electorate reveals some important structural weaknesses,
which might reinforce the already considerable electoral decline of the parties (the
CVP-PSC represented 48% of the national electorate in 1950, and by now (1987) it
has fallen back to 27%).
The CVP and the PSC have growing difficulties to attract young voters: in the
age category of 15-25 the CVP and the PSC only attract two thirds of its overall
share of the electorate, while in the age group of +55, the CVP is overrepresented by
21.3% and the PSC 59%. Thus the electorate of the CVP and the PSC is growing
old, and eventually will die out, while the recruitment of new voters is insufficient to
compensate the natural disappearance of the old voters.
 As far as the socio-economic composition is concerned, the CVP and the
PSC are overrepresented amongst the non-active (housewives, pensioners). The
CVP is in general normally represented amongst all professional categories, which
illustrates the interclass character of the party. However, the PSC is strongly
underrepresented amongst workers, and slightly overrepresented amongst the
employees and the higher cadres.
The CVP and the PSC are overrepresented amongst those with the lowest
educational backgrounds, while the PSC is also overrepresented amongst those with
university training.
Finally, with regard to church practice, 44% of the CVP-voters and 46% of
the PSC-voters attend church services weekly, against 21.3% % of the overall
population. Only 16% of the CVP and 12% of the PSC voters do not attend church
services at all, against 39% of the overall population. In spite of the officially
proclaimed deconfessional nature of the party, the CVP and the PSC remain
predominantly a party of Catholics, and up until now, religion is the strongest
statistical determinant for predicting the Christian Democratic vote.
When we look at the more direct motivations for voting for the CVP and the
PSC, we find that of the CVP voters that cast a list vote on the party, 59% declare to
vote for the party out of tradition (PSC 55%). This is the highest score amongst the
traditional Belgian parties. Only 27% (PSC 24%) say they vote for the party because
of the policies it pursues (against an overall average of 38%). In general, we notice
that the longer a party in Belgium has participated in government, the less it's
electorate votes for that party because of the policies it pursues. The explanation is
simple. Belgian governments are always coalition governments, and every coalition
party has to make compromises. Thus there is always a gap between what the party
wants, or promises during its electoral campaign, and what it realises in the
government. This gap between reality and what is desired grows the longer a party
participates in government. It becomes very large in the case of a party like the CVP
and the PSC, who are always in government. The Liberals and the Socialists have
from time to time the occasion to get an ideological "face lift" in the opposition. Thus,
within the CVP, regulary some secondary party leaders plead for an "opposition cure"
in order to reassert the party's ideological specificity.
On the other hand, the permanent participation in government also has
positive aspects for attracting voters. The demands of voters for government jobs,
the acceleration or the clearance of a citizen's dossier by the public administration (in
Belgium, all types of social transfers, like for instance a pension, are subject to
political interventions, etc.), can more easily be "arranged" by MPs of the CVP and
the PSC than the MPs of other parties. More than a quarter of the PSC and CVP
voters who cast a preference vote on a specific candidate (for the legislative
elections), say to do this as a way of gratifying the, candidate for the individual
services he has payed to the voter. At the local government level, where the CVP is
even more strongly represented in the executive, clientelism as a determinant for the
CVP vote is even more stronger. Thus, an opposition cure could cut both ways , it
could improve the party's ideological profile, but also damage the electorally
beneficial clientelist networks.
Anyway, an opposition cure would imply that the Socialist and the Liberals
would form a coalition, which is very unlikely in terms of policy vicinity. On the
socio-economic conflict dimension, it would mean a coalition of the Left and the
Right, against the Centre. Such a coalition is very unlikely as long as the
socio-economic conflict dimension remains salient. Thus, the CVP-PSC is more or
less doomed to remain the pivotal party for ever, with all its electorally negative
consequences.
5. The monopoly of the political representation of the Catholic pillar organisations by
the CVP and the PSC
The decreasing electoral attraction of CVP-PSC towards voters of the
Catholic pillar in spite of the strength of Catholic pillar organisations poses the
problem of the monopoly of the political representation of these Catholic interest
groups by the CVP-PSC. In spite of the decreasing church practice and a general
secularisation of society after Vaticanum II, the Catholic pillar organisations have lost
little strength, in terms of membership and viability.
On the contrary. As far as trade unionism is concerned, Belgium has one of
the highest degrees of syndicalisation in the world. About 80% of the workers and
employees are member of a trade union. The strongest trade union organisation in
terms of membership and votes in social elections is the Christian Democratic trade
union (ACVCSC), with 51% of all trade union members (against 41% for the Socialist
trade union). At the social elections, they score about the same percentages.
Second, the Christian health mutual insurance organisations ("mutualités")
represent nearly half (44% in 1977) of all citizens which fall under this system
(against only a little over a quarter for the Socialist "mutualités").
Third, in the socio-medical sector, more than half (52%) of the general
hospitals (and 74% of the psychiatric hospitals) are associated with Caritas
Catholica, the Catholic association of socio-medical organisations.
Catholic organisations also have a predominant (and usually majoritarian),
position in the sectors of retreat houses for the aged, the disabled, homes for juvenile
readaptation, family consultancy centres, home medical care, family and aged care,
sociocultural organisations (like adult education), youth organisations, etc.
In the politically sensitive sector of education, we find that in Flanders, 70%
of the school and university going population goes to Catholic institutions. In Wallonia
it is 50%.
Most Catholic pillar organisation managed to keep up their organisational
strength and membership in spite of the decreasing church participation and
deconfessionalisation of the public at large, by strenghtening the service character of
their organisations and by somewhat deconfessionalising their activities at the grass
roots level. On the other hand, the personal life style of those working in these
organisations (teachers, medical personnel, socio-cultural workers, etc.) still have to
conform to Catholic moral values. Thus unmarried mothers, divorced, unmarried
couples, and in many cases persons openly active in other political parties are not
tolerated as personnel.
In addition, most Flemish newspapers sympathise with the CVP. They cover
about 70% of the newspaper market (the Liberal newspaper cover about a quarter of
the market, and the Socialist only 4% (1987)), in Wallonia only 30% of the
newspapers are of Catholic tendency (but about 40% proclaim themselves to be
neutral in party political terms). Thus on the national level, Catholic papers cover
54% of the readers market, while the CVP-PSC electoral strength only amounts to
half of that proportion (27.5%).
Finally, even when by now only a fifth of the population attends weekly
church services, the Belgian population remains quite religious. More than four out of
five say that they feel most closely attracted by the Catholic (or Christian) religion,
more than half find that religion takes an important place in their life (1987), 79% of
the children are baptised, 69% of the marriages are also concluded in church, and
82% of the deceased are buried after a religious ceremony.
Thus, in comparison to the strength and viability of the Catholic pillar, the
CVP-PSC perform badly and are considered as the "weakest" sector of the Catholic
pillar. In the long run, this might question the role of the CVP and the PSC as the sole
political representative of these organisations. As already mentioned, the
Francophone workers organisation MOC has already adopted a system of pluralism
in terms of political representation, recognizing also some politicians of the Walloon
and Brussels regionalists as defenders of their interest. Within the Flemish Liberals,
some leaders would like to withdraw the party's exclusive support for public schools
and defend the interests of the Catholic schools as well. The Flemish Nationalists,
who largely draw their vote from the Catholic population, are not hostile towards the
interests of (some) Catholic pillar organisation. Thus in the long run, if the CVP-PSC
vote and political power continues to decline, some Catholic organisations might start
to adopted a system of pluralistic political representation. This pluralism would of
course lower the electoral support of the Catholic population for the CVP-PSC even
more.
6. The future of the PSC-CVP intergarty relations
The permanent governmental participation of the PSC is more a result of the
pivotal power of the CVP as the strongest party in Flanders, than of its own strength.
In Wallonia, the PSC is only the second or even third party (with only 22% of the
vote). This rather comfortable link with the CVP has also many disadvantages. In
Wallonia, there is an increasing feeling that the national state is being colonised by
the Flemish especially by the CVP. One speaks of "l'état Belgo-Flamand" and the
"CVP-state". The link with the CVP makes the PSC a complice of this "état
Belgo-Flamand" in the eyes of many Francophone voters. Thus, the PSC has tried to
profile itself as a party that defends the interests of the Francophone population as
much as the other Francophone parties, which of course increase the tensions
between the PSC and the CVP. In addition, as already mentioned, the coalition
preferences of the CVP and the PSC do not always coincide. In 1987, the PSC party
president forced the breakdown of the Martens VII government and made the CVP
"swallow" a coalition with the Socialists, against the will of the CVP party leadership
and rank-and-file (who strongly opposed a coalition with the Flemish Socialists). Thus
within the CVP, the possibility of an "asymetrical" coalition (for instance CVP +
Flemish and Francophone Liberals + Walloon Socialists, and thus without the PSC),
stars to find more and more supporters. This would seriously damage the PSC, who
profited strongly from its permanent government participation in terms of cabinet
seats and policy influence in the national and regional governments, patronage, etc.
Thus the PSC has to balance between a specific ideological identity which would
optimalise the party's electoral attraction, and becoming unacceptable as a coalition
partner in the eyes of the CVP.
